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URBAN POLITICS AND THE CRIMINAL COURTS. By Martin A. 
Levin. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1977. Pp. x, 
332. $20. 
Martin Levin's Urban Politics and the Criminal Courts is an 
ambitious attempt to explore the "urban political connection" to 
the dynamics "Of case disposition in the criminal courts. Levin notes 
that most previous studies of local courts have focused on the consid-
eration of alternate methods of selecting judicial personnel, with little 
attention given to the consequences of adopting one or another 
selection scheme.1 Newspapers and bar leaders exhort cities to 
"remove politics from the courts" and to adopt a "merit" method 
of selection to replace the venal, pernicious political-machine way 
of doing things. But the assumption that somehow "better justice," 
or, indeed, even "more efficient justice," will emerge from these 
changes is just that-an assumption. Levin attempts to test this 
assumption by comparing-in a way to be discussed below-two 
courts with very different methods of selection and by attempting to 
evaluate the consequences of these alternate schemes. 
This section of Levin's book, standing alone, is a valuable con-
tribution to the literature. Levin, however, chooses to go beyond 
this single important problem and address two other issues--criminal 
court sentencing policy and court delay. The consequences of this 
trifurcated approach are mixed. On the one hand, he often provides 
important insights, or at least new ways of thinking about these 
problems; on the other, he fails to develop completely the "'urban 
connection" analysis in these latter areas and to integrate the three 
topics systematically. Indeed, I wonder if it was worth the effort 
to attempt to link these three matters at all or if it would not have 
made more sense simply to present the book as a series of essays 
on problems of the criminal courts. 2 
In any event, the somewhat confusing presentation does not 
substantially detract from the contributions of this book. Time and 
1. See R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, THE PoLmCS OF TIIB BENCH AND TIIE BAR 
(1969). Watson and Downing, after reviewing the literature, do attempt to assess 
the impact of different methods of selection. 
2. Indeed, some of the material presented in this book originally appeared as 
separate essays in various journals. See Levin, Delay in Five Criminal Courts, 4 J. 
LEGAL Snm. 83 (1975); Levin, Policy Evaluation and Recidivism, 6 LAw & SoCY. 
REV. 17 (1971); Levin, Urban Politics and Judicial Behavior, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 193 
(1972). 
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again Levin sensitively and sensibly questions the conventional wisdom 
about criminal courts and develops interesting alternative explana-
tions. Though I will take issue with some of his arguments, I think 
that by and large this book stands as a provocative series of essays 
about the criminal justice system. 
I. CASE DISPOSITION PROCESSES 
Levin is primarily interested in contrasting the behavior of judges 
in two communities, Pittsburgh and Minneapolis, 3 which typify the 
political and the merit selection system, respectively. He focuses 
on sentencing-this is, as he indicates, the crucial task of the crim-
inal court, since the defendant in almost all cases will either plead 
or ·be found guilty. The crucial comparative variable thus becomes 
the sentences meted out to the defendants, and not the conviction rate. 
Before directly addressing these sentencing outcomes, Levin 
contrasts the underlying case disposition processes of the two cities. 
He argues that neither comports with the traditional view of plea 
bargaining in the literature. This view, Levin claims, is that 90% 
of all criminal cases involve a process-plea bargaining-in which 
the prosecutor actively negotiates charge reduction with the defense 
attorney. Levin argues -that, since neither of his cities fits this model, 
a major tangential contribution of his study is to call into question 
the "prosecutor negotiates with defense attorney" perspective on 
plea bargaining. 
In Pittsburgh, defendants generally do not plead guilty. They 
instead opt for abbreviated bench trials. In Minneapolis, most 
defendants plead guilty, but their plea is not a product of prior 
discussion with prosecutors. It would seem, then, that Levin is 
correct in rejecting the plea bargaining model. 
I suppose that, strictly speaking, Levin's point is well taken. 
In neither city do we find prosecutors auctioning off "deals" in active 
and ongoing negotiations with defense attorneys. However, if we 
expand the definition of plea bargaining beyond that used in the 
traditional literature, we find that the case disposition processes in 
both cities do involve plea bargaining-albeit in a somewhat different 
3. Levin is aware of the limits of a two-city design, M. LEVIN, URBAN POLITICS 
AND THE CRIMINAL COURTS 20-21 (1977), and is generally careful to avoid wide-
spread claims of generalizability. A more serious defect of his data is that they 
were collected in 1966 and 1967. Given the changes that have taken place in these 
two cities-the political machine has lost several elections in Pittsburgh, and Minne-
apolis has begun to employ partisan elections in selecting public officials, id. at 21, 
46-his analysis is not directly applicable to these two cities today. However, the 
hypotheses he generates from his research are nonetheless still worthy of careful 
consideration. It should also be noted that althoug~ he and I speak of Pittsburgh 
and Minneapolis, the boundaries of the judicial districts he studied do not entirely 
conform to city boundaries. 
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form. Levin himself refers to "functional equivalents" of plea bar-
gaining, 4 and he recognizes that the disposition processes of Pittsburgh 
and Minneapolis are really variants on the plea bargaining theme. He 
chooses, however, to emphasize the imperfect fit between his data 
and what he sees as the classic model in the plea bargaining literature 
rather than to develop the commonalities across these two cities and 
other cities in which plea bargaining processes have been scru-
tinized. 
I think that a definition of plea bargaining that limits the process 
to prosecutorial negotiation about charge reduction is too narrow. 
Instead, "plea bargaining" ought to include any negotiation-implicit 
or explicit-over sentence reduction, whether undertaken by a 
prosecutor or a judge. What defendants are really interested in 
when they plea bargain is not a charge reduction granted by the 
prosecutor; rather, they are interested in the sentence. The primary 
role of the criminal court is to impose sentences; the primary goal of 
defendants in "plea bargaining" is to obtain a prior agreement on the 
most favorable sentence. If they negotiate with prosecutors in some 
systems, this is plea bargaining; if they negotiate with judges in other 
systems, this is also plea bargaining. Even if their negotiations are 
not explicit-e.g., if they plead guilty because they have good reason 
to expect that such a plea will be rewarded with a more lenient sen-
tence-this can be seen as "implicit plea bargaining."5 Who is 
negotiating and how they are negotiating involve differences in degree, 
not kind. Whether we call the process plea bargaining, sentence 
bargaining, negotiated dispositions, or case reevaluation, we are 
seeing defendants across most communities trying to obtain a more 
favorable sentence by some variant of bargaining. The processes in 
Pittsburgh and Minneapolis are interesting not because they do not 
comport with a narrow definition of plea bargaining, but because of 
the particular form that plea bargaining takes in these communities. 
Pittsburgh, which ostensibly has a low guilty plea rate, relies 
on bench trials that are striking in their resemblance to sentence 
bargaining in the prosecutor's office. They are, in essence, "slow 
pleas of guilty."6 The difference is that judges, rather than prosecu-
tors, hear the defense attorney's recounting of "what a wonderful 
young man the defendant is," how "he loves his mother, fears God, 
works hard," or how "his involvement in this offense was an aberrant 
incident atypical of such an outstanding individual." Levin's own 
4. M. LEVIN, supra note 3, at 86. 
5. Heumann, A Note on Plea Bargaining and Case Pressure, 9 LAW & SOCY. 
REV. 515, 526 (1915). 
6. For a more detailed discussion of "slow pleas of guilty," see Mather, Some 
Determinants of the Method of Case Disposition: Decision-Making by Public De-
fenders in Los Angeles, 8 LAw &SOCY. REV. 187 (1973). 
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discussion of the Pittsburgh bench "trials" makes this clear: 
Such "trials" usually last less than fifteen minutes, though they 
may take thirty minutes. The defense presentation is not concerned 
with guilt or innocence since it usually is implicitly assumed by all 
parties involved in the process that the defendant is guilty of at 
.least some wrongdoing. It is hoped that these statements will 
mitigate the judge's sentence. As one defense attorney told an in-
terviewer in explaining his strategy in "slow pleas," "Everyone has 
a mother, and if he doesn't, well, then I try to use this in his favor 
also."7 
The defense attorney argues mitigation, not innocence. He knows 
which chords to strike, which themes to embellish, and probably 
what kind of sentence will emerge. At a minimum he knows that 
penitence at these hearings will stand the defendant in good stead 
when the judge sentences him; more likely, the defense attorney 
knows the routine "price" for the offense and has apprised the de-
fendant of the likely sentence. Though an analysis of the disposition 
statistics of the Pittsburgh courts suggests a high trial rate, careful 
scrutiny of these trials reveals that they are. nothing more than sentence 
negotiations carried out in front of a judge. 
Minneapolis presents a very different picture. There the guilty 
plea rate is high, but with little prior negotiation with prosecutors. 
Again this does not mean-using our broader perspective of plea 
bargaining-that there is no plea bargaining in Minneapolis. I 
would argue that where defendants know ( or believe) that they 
receive a more lenient sentence for a guilty plea and thus plead to 
avail themselves of this judicial largesse, they are engaging in a 
form of implicit plea bargaining. The judges Levin interviewed and 
the data he analyzed support this conclusion. For a variety of 
reasons, judges in Minneapolis feel justified in meting out more 
severe sentences to defendants who go to trial. The high guilty plea 
rate itself suggests that plea bargaining is flourishing. Furthermore, 
Levin reports that defendants in Minneapolis are not simply gambling 
on a reward for pleading guilty: ten of the seventeen judges on the 
Minneapolis court will indicate specific sentences to be imposed 
before accepting a guilty plea. 8 
7. _M. LEVIN, supra note 3, at 80. 
8. Levin's analysis is somewhat confusing on the issue of sentence negotiation in 
Minneapolis. Such negotiations seem to run counter to the asserted formalistic pre-
ferences of Minneapolis judges. At one point, Levin reports the comments of one 
judge in Minneapolis whose views are close to what we would anticipate in an osten-
sibly formal, legalistic court: "Now, these kinds of arrangements [i.e., negotiations] 
can be the basis of the postconviction reversal. So I won't talk to [the attorneys] 
before they enter a plea." Id. at 107. Yet Levin's statement that "only ten of the 
seventeen Minneapolis judges are willing to participate in such discussions," Id. at 
68 (emphasis added), provides quantitative support for the belief that a majority of 
the Minneapolis judges do not subscribe to this particular judge's views. 
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Levin's analysis suggests that, when we observe a system that 
seemingly does not rely on explicit negotiations between prosecutors 
and defense attorneys, we ought not to reject too quickly the possi-
bility that plea bargaining talces place. Rather, we ought to search 
carefully for "functional equivalents" of plea bargaining. It seems 
likely that in most systems in the United States, and perhaps else-
where, these "functional , equivalents" account for the disposition 
of most criminal cases. Perry Mason, The Defenders, and Owen 
Marshall notwithstanding, negotiations-and not trials-are what 
the criminal justice system is all about. 
II. CASE OUTCOMES AND THE URBAN 
POLITICAL CONNECTION 
I have argued that the differences between the way cases are 
resolved in Pittsburgh and Minneapolis are more matters of style 
than substance. The machinery creaks a bit differently in each, but 
the result is either a slow or a fast plea of guilty. The significant 
differences between these two cities: are in the sentences handed 
down by the judges. Pittsburgh judges are much more lenient than 
Minneapolis judges. For comparable crimes committed by defen-
dants of the same race with similar prior records, Pittsburgh judges 
are more likely to grant probation and more likely to sentence de-
fendants to shorter periods of imprisonment. The "going rate" for a 
crime seems to be much higher in Minneapolis. In addition, Minnea-
polis judges are much less willing to talce individual mitigating cir-
cumstances into account in sentencing. Minneapolis judges are more 
legalistic and formal-they are guided primarily by the statutory 
penalties for particular crimes and only marginally influenced by 
the defendant's background or the particular facts of the case. They 
tend to view -their jobs in terms of protecting society. In contrast, 
the Pittsburgh judges are much more particularistic in their sentencing 
behavior. They accord considerable weight to possible mitigating 
circumstances in the offense or in the defendant's background . 
. Rather than feeling themselves tightly bound by the formal statutory 
provisions, they view it as their task to consider all aspects of the case 
and to arrive at a sentencing decision in which •"substantial justice"9 
is done. The consistency and harshness of the Minneapolis judges' 
sentencing pattern is replaced in Pittsburgh with a highly individualis-
tic and relatively mild sentencing scheme. 
It is in his attempt to account for these differences in sentencing 
outcomes that Levin malces his most important contribution. He 
argues that the radically different procedures for selecting judges 
in Pittsburgh and Minneapolis significantly, albeit indirectly, affect 
9. Id. at 128. 
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sentencing. In Pittsburgh, judges are nominated primarily because 
of their activity in the Democratic Party, and they run on a partisan 
ballot in the election. Their election is generally assured. The 
selection system, then, typifies the party machine-dominated model. 
In Minneapolis, on the other hand, the judicial selection procedure 
is "reformed." The bar associations are the crucial organizations 
which determine nominations, elections are nonpartisan, and the 
political parties have little input. 
The political machinery in Pittsburgh draws its candidates dis-
proportionately from the ranks of local ethnic groups whose members 
have been active in Pittsburgh politics. These candidates have had 
experience in resolving particularistic disputes. They have de-
veloped some empathy for the concerns of defendants as well as 
victims. They understand what life is like "out on the streets"; 
their prior jobs have stressed the ability to achieve equitable resolu-
tions to conflicts in which both parties have somewhat credible 
claims. This sort of ethnic and experiential background has obvious 
relationships to the sentencing decisions described above. 
In contrast, Minneapolis judges come primarily from white Anglo-
Saxon families, have had very little experience in politics, and 
generally have worked in a traditional law firm. Their backgrounds 
are more, middle-class oriented, and their prior experience is geared 
more toward the interests of "society." This background is mani-
fested, when they are elected to the bench, in their legalistic orienta-
tion and in their relative lack of empathy for mitigating circumstances. 
Levin downplays socioeconomic background as an explanation 
for judicial sentencing behavior and accords greater weight to the 
influence of the jobs judges held before coming to the bench. There 
. is a high correlation between background and pre-judicial work 
experience, however, and separating the two becomes difficult. 
Levin does note that the few "atypical" judges in each city (WASPS 
in Pittsburgh, ethnics in Minneapolis) are like their fellow judges 
in the same city notwithstanding their different socioeconomic back-
grounds. His explanation is the similarity in job experience. 
The partisan selection process of Pittsburgh, then, maximizes 
the probability that individuals with a particularistic bent will be 
chosen as judges, while the power of bar committees in Minneapolis 
ensures that most candidates will emerge from the more formal, 
legalistic mold. Levin's point is that changing the selection machinery 
changes the type of individual who becomes a judge and thus is 
likely to influence the sentencing patterns that emerge. 
Two caveats need to be placed on Levin's discussion. First, as 
he is well aware, he does not have the formal "control" cities neces-
sary to make his case more convincingly.10 To test the effect of 
10. Id. at 19. 
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selection processes on the probability of certain types of individuals 
being chosen, one would like to control for other differences by 
having examples both of a partisan plan in a community like Minne-
apolis and of a nonpartisan plan in a community like Pittsburgh. 
Presumably, sentences would become milder in the former and 
harsher in the latter. But Levin leaves open the possibility that 
this pattern might not necessarily emerge. He notes that something 
more general-a political culture--may be simultaneously influenc-
ing the local court as well as the local political system.11 Thus the 
differences he found between Pittsburgh and Minneapolis may say 
less about the selection procedure itself--other than the fact that 
the selection of the selection procedure says something about the 
community's political culture--than it does about the po1itical cul-
ture of the two respective communities. These differ substantially, and 
it may be the case that, even if the selection procedures were reversed, 
the pool of eligible judges, and more generally the community's values 
as translated into cues to the local court, would still yield a judiciary 
that was particularistic in Pittsburgh and legalistic and formal in 
Minneapolis. Coming to grips with the possible confounding in-
fluence of political culture is not an easy task. Clearly it requires 
examining many more cities and establishing some objeotive measures 
of what precisely is meant by "political culture." Levin takes the 
first step; subsequent research ought to expand his study to include 
more communities and to gauge systematically the effects of the 
selection process when "political culture" is held constant. 
The second caveat regarding Levin's explanation of the differences 
across the two courts is ·based on the suggestion in his data that on-
the-bench socialization accounts for the intra-court consistency and 
inter-court differences he finds. Levin quotes one judge who re-
marked: "Like everyone else I am the product of my background, 
but nothing in my experience prepared me for making sentencing 
decisions. So after I got on the bench I had to do a lot of reading 
on sentencing because I really knew nothing about it."12 Judges 
assume their roles relatively uninformed about sentencing and receive 
very little guidance on what the appropriate sentences ought to be. 
The rates they eventually establish for particular crimes may be 
a product less of their backgrounds, their pre-judicial careers, or the 
political culture than of their learning from their fellow judges the 
"going rates" for particular crimes. These going rates-the stan-
dard operating procedures-in part are "the way things have always 
been done." Courts have their habits of disposition just as other 
11. Id. at 153. For another discussion of the relationship between "political 
culture" and a legal organization, see J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF PoucE- BEHAVIOR. 
233-36 (1970). 
12. M. LEVIN, supra note 3, at 141. 
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organizations do. Thus, going rates would not directly reflect such 
factors as judicial background or political culture. At least some of 
the differences Levin discerned between Pittsburgh and Minneapolis 
may reflect the influence of these court norms. Again, this would 
be a fruitful area for further research. 
Ill. SENTENCING POLICY AND COURT DELAY: 
°SOME COMMENTS 
As indicated at the outset of this review, Levin supplements his 
comparative analysis of Pittsburgh and Minneapolis with two addi-
tional studies-evaluations of sentencing policy and of court delay. 
Space constraints preclude a systematic critique of these discussions; 
thus, I will limit my remarks to some general comments on Levin's 
ideas. 
As Levin reminds us, the criminal court operates under the 
conflicting pressures of several different goals. We expect the court 
to rehabilitate and to deter, to provide equitable treatment and to 
reduce the probability of recidivism, to reflect the community's sense 
of the just punishment for a crime and to provide justice for the 
defendants who come before it. These goals may all be admirable, 
but, as Levin demonstrates, there are tradeoffs involved-an attempt 
to implement any particular one may reduce the ability to implement 
others. It is precisely his sensitivity to these tradeoffs that makes 
his section on court sentencing so interesting. 
Levin shows, for example, that, given a goal of crime prevention 
through rehabilitation, one ought to opt generally for probation 
rather than incarceration, since the data suggest that an individual 
placed on probation is less likely to recidivate.13 However, if the 
goal is crime reduction-i.e., reducing opportunities for the defendant 
to commit further crimes-the court ought to in.crease the probability 
of imprisonment. To support this argument, Levin reviews the litera-
ture on certainty and severity of punishment and concludes that im-
prisonment seems to have some crime reduction effect. He is not 
clear--nor is the literature--on whether this result is caused by 
individual deterrence, general deterrence, or the inability of the de-
fendant himself to commit crimes against society at large while he is 
imprisoned. Levin suggests that we should opt for probation for 
first-time offenders and incarceration for those who are already 
13. Levin reviews a number of major studies on this question. These include ex-
periments in which juveniles who did not clearly require incarceration were randomly 
assigned to probation instead of incarceration. See M. WARREN, THE COMMUNITY 
TREATMENT PROJECT AFTER FIVE YEARS (1967). Thus, his conclusions cannot be 
dismissed simply by arguing that those who usually receive probation are precisely 
those who are less likely to recidivate in the first place. M. LEVIN, supra note 3, 
at 160-71. 
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recidivists. He softens his imprisonment argument with the suggestion 
that prison facilities ought to ·be improved dramatically and that 
much more attention ought to be given to alternative settings for 
incarcerating defendants. 
These policy recommendations are controversial and can be 
deba;ed on both empirical and normative grounds. Nevertheless, 
I think that Levin is to be commended for providing a careful and 
clear context for this debate. Reform of sentencing policy is probably 
the single "hottest" topic in criminal justice circles. Levin's thoughts 
on this problem will introduce a modicum of reason into this difficult, 
if not occasionally intractable, area. 
Levin is similarly provocative in his discussion of court delay. 
Though his analysis is very preliminary and exploratory, and though 
he uses five courts that are not completely comparable, which creates 
problems in interpreting his findings, 14 his conclusions about delay 
are thought provoking because they run counter to the simplistic 
judgments often made in this area. Levin rejects the notion that 
one can explain most delay in court simply by looking at the court's 
case volume or its inefficient administrative apparatus. Instead, 
he argues that delay is often a product of actions initiated by court 
participants themselves. ~ response to the basic incentive systems 
that guide prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys. He is particu-
larly persuasive in his discussion of the incentives of private attorneys 
to delay cases. For example, a private defense attorney will often 
request-and receive-a continuance in a case because he has not 
yet received his fee. In some courts the attorney signals the judge 
by asking for a continuance "pursuant to Rule 1 of this court"; in 
others, less. subtle, the continuance is granted because a witness, 
"Mr. Green," has not shown up.111 
The discussion of delay, both in the text and in a lengthy 
appendix devoted to an analysis of delay in five courts, becomes 
quite involved. This level of scrutiny is probably inevitable, how-
ever, if one is to scratch below the common "case volume leads to 
delay" argument and explore the reasons for high delay in low-volume 
courts, and vice versa. Quantitative data on backlog, personnel 
levels, and types of personnel--e.g., percentage of private attorneys 
compared to public defenders-and qualitative data concerning court 
disposition processes-plea bargaining patterns, sanctions leveled 
against pre-trial motions, and so on-need to be collected before any 
14. The courts studied include those which screen felony cases and often dispose 
of minor felonies, those which resolve minor and major felonies, and those which 
handle major felonies after screening. M. LEVIN, supra note 3, at 226-34. Though 
I think his comparative analysis is fundamentally sound, the differences among these 
five courts occasionally leave the reader feeling as if apples and oranges were being 
contrasted. 
15. Id. at 240. 
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more definitive statements about the causes of and remedies for 
delay can be made. Levin's analysis anticipates the issues that 
must be grappled with and provides a useful point of origin for 
the design of some broader-scale studies. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The academic study of trial courts is only in its infancy. Histori-
cally, political scientists and legal scholars have been preoccupied 
with appellate court decisions and appellate court decisionmaking. 
Levin's book is an exception to these earlier preoccupations and is an 
important contribution to the emerging study of criminal trial courts. 
Though he raises as many questions as he resolves and though some 
of his analyses are open to criticism, he addresses the important 
theoretical and policy problems in an astute and refreshing fashion. 
My guess is that when the arguments are thrashed out in the journals, 
Levin will end up being more right than wrong. And, given the 
state of the art in the study of trial courts, that would be a more 
than modest achievement. 
Milton Heumann 
Assistant Professor of Political Science 
The University of Michigan 
